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This paper investigates whether and how various characteristics of CEOs and corporate 
boards are related to the severity of corporate governance problems within firms. The latter is 
proxied by private benefits of control, which we measure for dual class stock firms using the 
voting premium approach. Our empirical analysis is based on data from Russia and takes 
advantage of the extreme corporate governance problems in the country, considerable 
variation in corporate governance practices across firms and over time, and presence of a 
large and exogenously created (during the process of privatization) group of dual class stock 
companies. The data are assembled from the RTS, SKRIN and SPARK databases and 
include over 200 firms observed in 1997-2009, with over 1000 observations in total. Our 
econometric analysis suggests a quadratic relationship between private benefits of control 
and CEO ownership with a minimum at about 4% CEO ownership, a positive association 
between CEO tenure and private benefits, and a quadratic in CEO age with a dip in private 
benefits at about 52 years of age. There is also a quadratic relationship between private 
benefits of control and board size, implying the optimality of medium-sized (about 9-10 
directors) boards. We find no gender effects on private benefits of control. 
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In the last decades, the corporate finance literature has seen a growing interest in the link 
between corporate governance and performance, on the one hand, and various characteristics 
of CEOs and corporate boards, including directors’ gender, age, tenure, and ownership stakes 
in the firm, on the other hand. Many studies have examined whether and how these 
characteristics may affect the severity of the corporate governance conflict between suppliers 
and users of capital, a key issue in the functioning of the modern corporation (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). For example, a recent paper by Yim (2010) shows an important role of a 
CEO’s age in shaping corporate policies. Adams and Ferreira (2009) focus on the hitherto 
rarely investigated issue of gender composition of boards. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) 
provide a comprehensive review of the role of corporate boards, including board size and the 
presence of independent directors. Corporate governance effects of managerial ownership also 
remain high on the research agenda (e.g., Benson and Davidson 2009) despite the long history 
of this research, which dates back to the seminal contributions by Berle and Means (1932) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
All these issues are of considerable interest not only from the research perspective, but 
also highly relevant from the practitioner’s viewpoint as well as from the policy angle. Better 
understanding of how various corporate governance arrangements work may, for example, 
help to shape corporate law (as well as regulations adopted by stock exchanges) which 
typically contain provisions concerning the size and composition of corporate boards, 
establishment of various committees, as well as those regarding accounting and disclosure 
standards. Indeed, recent years have seen a number of important developments in corporate 
law on all continents, such as the adoption of Russia’s law on joint-stock companies (Black 
and Kraakman 1996), the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US (Romano 2005), and corporate 
governance reforms in India (Khanna 2009). 
Importantly, most empirical studies that try to evaluate corporate governance effects of 
various governance mechanisms and arrangements rely heavily on traditional performance 
measures, most notably Tobin’s Q and various financial ratios based on accounting data (e.g., 
Bhagat and Black 2002; Karamanou and Verfas 2005; Adjaoud et al. 2007; Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein 2007). A key assumption here is that, whenever a corporate governance conflict 
arises, it will eventually be reflected in corporate performance. For example, managerial 
opportunism (regardless of whether it comes from “shirking” or “stealing” behavior) will 
damage the long-term performance of firms, and will be reflected in their lower 
capitalizations once investors learn about the problem.  
  2A fundamental issue, however, is that these traditional performance measures are 
subject to various external influences such as exogenous firm-specific and industry-specific 
shocks and can suffer from measurement problems (stemming, for example, from variations 
in accounting rules and practices) that can hardly be properly controlled for in empirical 
analysis. This may explain, at least in part, why researchers often come to different and 
inconsistent conclusions concerning, for example, the effect of independent directors, audit 
and compensation committees, and other board characteristics on company performance (e.g., 
Bhagat and Black 2002; Beiner et al. 2004; Van, Postma and Sterken 2008). A clearer picture 
of how various corporate governance mechanisms and arrangements work requires a better 
measure, which would be less subject to such noisy influences.  
Importantly, the recent corporate finance and governance literature offers a candidate 
measure of this type called “private benefits of control” (see Dyck and Zingales 2004). 
Theoretically, private benefits of control capture pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits that a 
party in control over the firm can extract without sharing them with other shareholders. They 
may involve high managerial wages, transfer pricing, payments in kind or simply 
psychological benefits from being in control over the firm. If private benefits of control could 
be estimated empirically, they would provide a better idea (as compared with traditional 
measures of corporate performance) of the severity of corporate governance problems within 
firms. This indicator would also be useful in identifying firm-level correlates and 
determinants of corporate governance problems.  This is exactly what our study attempts to 
achieve.   
  In particular, our paper looks at the old question of which characteristics of CEOs and 
corporate boards are associated with better corporate governance, but from a rather unusual 
angle. Instead of relating key characteristics of CEOs and corporate boards to traditional 
measures of company performance, we link them to a measure of private benefits of control. 
The latter is estimated using the voting premium approach, which is based on comparing 
prices of voting and non-voting stocks in dual class stock companies. This is the key 
innovation and contribution of our paper to the corporate finance and governance literature. 
Our empirical analysis focuses on Russia, which is not an accident. First, Russia has 
long been regarded as country with extreme corporate governance problems. As noted by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), in the mid-1990s, managers and/or controlling shareholders of 
Russian companies had immense opportunities for diverting both profits and assets to 
themselves. Goetzmann et al. (2003) even labeled Russia “a Wild West of corporate control”. 
At the same time, Russia has been known for considerable variation in corporate governance 
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In other words, the country can be regarded as a unique laboratory for studying corporate 
governance problems. Second, our paper takes advantage of the considerable number of dual-
class stock firms (those issuing voting and non-voting shares) traded in the Russian stock 
market. This gives us a large enough sample of firms for which we can easily compute a 
measure of private benefits of control. Third, we exploit the fact that most Russian dual class 
stock companies were created not because of the desire of their founders to retain control over 
productive assets while obtaining external financing, but because of the specific design of the 
Russian privatization. Thus, the sample selection issue does not apply or at least is of much 
smaller concern in our study as compared with studies of mature stock markets. To sum up, in 
the Russian case the researcher can obtain a proxy for private benefits of control for a large 
and non-selected sample of firms. Our paper takes advantage of these three prominent 
features of the country’s corporate sector. 
This study is based on a novel hand-collected dataset of Russian dual stock companies 
that combines the 1997-2009 share trade data from the Russian Trading System (RTS) stock 
exchange with additional information from companies’ charters and quarterly reports to the 
Federal Financial Market Service (FFMS). Overall, we have at our disposal an unbalanced 
panel of more than 200 firms observed over 13 years, with more than 1000 observations in 
total. The newly collected data also allow us to make a number of important observations 
about the evolution of corporate governance in Russia, an important emerging market, over 
the last years. This is another key contribution of our paper. 
Our econometric analysis suggests that private benefits of control decline with CEO 
ownership in the range of 0 to 4 percent and increase thereafter. CEO tenure appears to be 
positively related to the size of private benefits. We also find a dip in private benefits of 
control at CEO age of about 52 years. There is evidence that very small and very large 
supervisory boards are less effective (are associated with larger private benefits of control) 
than medium-sized boards with about 9-10 directors. Private benefits of control appear to be a 
decreasing function of the average age of the board’s members. Finally, we find no gender 
effects, in particular, the gender composition of supervisory boards seems not to matter.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on key conceptual and 
measurement issues related to private benefits of control. Section 3 presents the institutional 
background for dual class shares in Russia. Section 4 provides a review of the literature and 
formulates a number of hypotheses to be tested. The methodology of our empirical analysis is 
  4described in Section 5. Section 6 describes the data and sample used in the paper. The 
estimation results are presented in Section 7 and discussed in Section 8. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. Private benefits of control: conceptual and measurement issues  
Starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Grossman and Hart (1980), the idea of private 
benefits of control has been one of the centerpieces of the modern theoretical and empirical 
corporate finance literature. Private benefits arise when corporate resources are used to the 
sole or main advantage of the party that controls the firm. They may take a variety of forms, 
from rather innocuous psychological benefits to high managerial wages and outright theft of 
corporate resources. Whether pecuniary or non-pecuniary, private benefits of control are 
usually extracted to the detriment of (minority) shareholders and other investors in the firm. 
Corporate governance, as seen from the agency perspective, is largely about how to ensure 
effective restraints on extraction of such private benefits by managers and/or controlling 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Dyck and Zingales 2004). 
If properly quantified, private benefits of control would provide a good idea of the 
severity of corporate governance problems within firms. Analyses of determinants of these 
private benefits would then help to find effective corporate governance mechanisms and 
arrangements. The problem, however, is that private benefits of control are intrinsically 
unobservable. As Nicodano and Sembenelli (2004, p. 227) put it, private benefits from control 
“consist in unobservable consumption and investment opportunities deriving from 
discretionary power to allocate company resources”. Indeed, if private benefits could be easily 
and reliably evaluated they would immediately loose their “privacy” and minority 
shareholders could bring in a lawsuit against the corporation or the controlling owner. The 
difficulty of measuring private benefits of control is the principal reason why they have not 
been extensively used in the literature in lieu of traditional indicators of company 
performance, such as ROE or Tobin’s Q (which are only indirect proxies for corporate 
governance problems in firms). 
The finance literature has nevertheless developed two approaches to approximate 
private benefits of control. The first, called the voting premium approach, is based on 
comparing prices of voting and non-voting shares in companies that have issued two different 
classes of stock (Lease, McConnell and Mikkelson 1983; Zingales 1995). The second, called 
the control premium approach, is based on comparing the price of shares in transactions 
involving control block change and the price of shares in the stock market after the 
announcement of such control block sales (Barclay and Holderness 1989).  
  5The first method associates private benefits with the voting premium, which is 
conventionally defined as the difference between the price of voting shares and the price of 
non-voting shares divided by the price of non-voting shares. The theoretical linkage between 
the voting premium and private benefit of control is best illustrated in the model developed by 
Zingales (1995), which is briefly described in Appendix 1. In contrast to non-voting shares, 
voting shares confer control rights (and potentially give access to private benefits) and are 
therefore valued higher. In the stock market, voting shares have higher prices as even a small 
fraction of them may be pivotal in a control contest while non-voting shares are irrelevant in 
battles for control. The voting premium therefore reflects the price a potential bidder would be 
willing to pay to atomistic holders of voting stock in order to establish control over the 
company. Thus, the higher the private benefits of control, the higher the voting premium. In 
the empirical corporate literature, the voting premium approach to measuring private benefits 
of control has been used in Nenova (2003), Doidge (2004) and Desai, Dyck and Zingales 
(2007), among others.  
The second method considers the difference between the price of shares in 
transactions involving control block change and the price in the stock market after the 
announcement of the control block sale (Barclay and Holderness 1989). This control premium 
approach implies that, as long as the exchange price reflects the value of corporate benefits 
that accrue to all shareholders in proportion to their fractional ownership, any difference 
between the block price and the exchange price reflects benefits that accrue to the blockholder 
alone – the private benefits from control. This approach has been applied, among others, by 
Franks and Mayer (2001), Dyck and Zingales (2004), and Albuquerque and Schroth (2010).   
Both methods have some deficiencies (see, e.g., Benos and Weisbach 2004). A key 
issue is sample selection, which is typical of both cases. Indeed, block trades are not everyday 
events and are unlikely to occur in a random fashion. There may be strong links between the 
performance of a company in the past (as well as its expected performance in the future) and 
the probability that a large block of its shares changes hands. Barclay and Holderness (1989) 
also note that large blocks tend to be traded intact when private benefits are substantial but 
tend to be broken up when private benefits are small. Thus, the average private benefits 
estimated from block trades are likely to be overstated. Similarly, while the voting premium is 
continuously observed over time (at least in publicly traded firms), there are relatively few 
companies issuing dual class shares in the first place and these companies are typically not 
representative of the whole population of firms. In fact, companies often introduce dual-class 
share structures because their founders or controlling shareholders want to raise funds without 
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Becht et al. 2002). Thus, the decision to issue non-voting stock is likely to be related to the 
size of the benefits of control. When private benefits of control are small, there is little reason 
for issuing non-voting stock.  
 
3. Institutional background  
The development of the Russian corporate sector offers an excellent opportunity to study 
private benefits of control, especially using the voting premium approach. As explained below, 
the country has a considerable number of dual-class stock firms most of which were created 
“exogenously”, that is, due to the specific design of the Russian privatization program. Thus, 
the sample selection issue is of much smaller concern in Russia as compared with most other 
stock markets.  
Dual class shares were authorized in Russia in 1992, when a major presidential decree 
on privatization was enacted.
1
 This document established three basic options for privatizing 
large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises, which were to be transformed into joint-
stock companies. It also provided a standard corporate charter, which all privatized companies 
had to adopt. According to the decree, enterprises that followed the so-called “option 1” of 
privatization were re-established as companies with up to 25 percent of their charter capital 
represented by preferred (non-voting) shares and the rest represented by common (voting) 
shares. The other two options (“option 2” and “option 3”) did not envisage the issue of non-
voting stocks. The equity of companies that followed these options was formed by common 
shares only. 
Why did some companies choose “option 1” and others choose the other two options 
during the process of privatization? The existing literature tends to suggest (Boycko et al. 
1995; Blasi et al. 1997; Chubais 1999) that insiders (managers and workers, the key players at 
the first stage of the privatization process) preferred privatizing their firms in 1992-1994 using 
“option 2” and “option 3”, which would give them full control over the firms, and resorted to 
“option 1”, which would split the firms’ equity between voting and non-voting stock and give 
them non-voting shares for free, only when they did not have enough funds to purchase the 
firms’ assets (see Hare and Muravyev 2003). 
There have been a number of studies that treated the method of privatization as an 
exogenous factor with regard to the performance of firms and even used it as instrument for 
                                                 
1 See Presidential Decree No. 721 dated 1 July 1992 “On organizational measures on transformation of state 
enterprises and voluntary associations of state enterprises into joint-stock companies”. 
  7the firms’ post-privatization ownership structure (Earle and Estrin 1997). Perhaps, a more 
nuanced and careful view is that “option 1” (resulting in the issue of non-voting shares) was 
typical of relatively large and capital-intensive enterprises that could not be bought out by 
their managers and employees under the other options due to wealth constraints. This is one 
of the conclusions in a recent work by Sprenger (2011) which analyses the determinants of the 
post-privatization ownership structures and also the choice of the privatization method. 
Overall, the existing literature does not suggest any mechanism by which the use of “option 
1” (= the issue of dual class stock) in the process of privatization is related to the magnitude 
of private benefits of control. We therefore build on this literature to claim that the selection 
issue is of no or little importance in our analysis.  
The legal status of the two classes of shares, common and preferred, was initially 
specified in the standard corporate charter. The rights attached to common (voting) stock were 
quite similar to those existing in most other jurisdictions (they are basically restricted to the 
right to vote at shareholder meetings and the right to receive dividends, which are indefinite). 
The status of preferred shares was, in contrast, rather peculiar. While sharing a number of 
features with common shares, they did not confer general voting rights but instead provided a 
number of pecuniary privileges to their owners. In particular, companies with dual class stock 
were required to allocate at least 10 percent of their net profit to dividends on preferred shares. 
In addition, the dividend on preferred shares was bounded below by the dividend on common 
stocks. Preferred shareholders were also granted superior rights in the event of company 
liquidation. Importantly, the standard charter stipulated temporary enfranchisement of 
preferred shares in the case the dividend on them was not paid or was not paid in full, and it 
also endowed preferred shareholders with the right to vote on all decisions that involved their 
“class rights”. Effectively, preferred shareholders were granted veto power on decisions that 
concerned their class rights, as such decisions required a supermajority (two-thirds) approval 
by these investors.  
Since the start of Russia’s privatization, there have been some changes in both the 
country’s corporate law and individual corporate charters concerning the legal status of 
preferred shares (see Muravyev, 2009b for details). However, the basic principle that 
preferred shares do not vote but are instead entitled to a superior dividend has largely 
remained intact. Thus, the differentiation of voting rights across classes – a deviation from the 
  8one-share-one-vote rule – has been retained. This is crucial for estimating private benefits of 
control based on the prices of common and preferred shares.
2  
There have been more than 200 dual class stock companies traded in the Russian stock 
market, with the earliest trades in the RTS
3 dating back to September 1996. The magnitude of 
the voting premium has fluctuated a great deal between 1996 and 2009, with the highest 
values achieved right after the 1998 financial crisis (Muravyev 2009a). The high magnitudes 
of the voting premium, often above 100 percent, suggest large private benefits and significant 
risks of minority shareholder expropriation in Russian firms. Based on the large voting 
premium in Russia, Goetzmann et al. (2003) even labeled the country “a Wild West of 
corporate control”.  
 
4. Key characteristics of directors, managers and the private benefits of control 
A CEO is the key decision maker in the firm and has considerable discretion in determining 
its policies. A key issue in corporate governance, at least from the agency perspective which 
our study draws upon, is that this discretion can be used not for maximizing shareholder value, 
but for extracting private benefits from control over the firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The 
scope of such opportunistic behavior depends on a variety of factors, such as how well the 
CEO’s incentives are aligned with those of shareholders (for example, via ownership and 
incentive contracts) and how effective the mechanisms of control are. These mechanisms are 
usually thought to include the capital markets, the legal and regulatory system, the product 
and factor markets, and the internal control system, the key element of which is the board of 
directors (Jensen 1997). 
Below we briefly review the theoretical and empirical literature on how characteristics 
of CEOs and boards of directors may affect the magnitude of private benefits of control and 
                                                 
2 Ideally, the two types of stock should be identical and differ only with respect to their voting rights. This is 
rarely observed in the real world, however. For example, Zingales (1995, p.1057) in his US study notes that 
“only 21 companies have nonvoting common stock. In all other cases both classes are voting, but their voting 
power differs. The majority of companies (57) attribute ten votes to the superior voting class and one to the 
inferior voting class.” Also, in many companies “…inferior voting shares have the right to elect a minority of 
directors.” As Zingales notes, “these differences in relative voting power create some problems in the cross-
sectional comparisons”. In other jurisdictions, non-voting stocks may be truly non-voting, but superior in terms 
of cash flow rights. What really matters is the deviation from the one-share-one-vote rule, however introduced. 
Israeli companies, for example, used to introduce such deviation by issuing shares which were entitled to one 
vote each but had different par values and hence, provided different dividends (Levy 1983). 
3 The RTS was the first electronic trading system in Russia, established in September 1995; it was transformed 
into the RTS Stock Exchange in 1997. 
  9firm performance in general. We show that for most factors mentioned, the available 
evidence, whether theoretical or empirical, is controversial, which suggests the importance of 
further research in the field. 
 
4.1. Managerial ownership 
There are competing hypotheses concerning the effect of CEO and director ownership on 
company performance. According to the incentive alignment hypothesis developed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), ownership provides managers with monetary incentives to maximize 
profit and thus improves company performance. An alternative hypothesis says that 
ownership by managers promotes their entrenchment, which is particularly costly when they 
have low qualification, prefer to live an easy life, or extract private benefits of control in some 
other forms (Morck et al. 1988; Stulz 1988). Higher managerial ownership also exposes 
managers to higher risk relative to diversified shareholders and thus stimulates them to reject 
value-enhancing, but risky projects (Guay 1999; Ross 2004). Given these competing 
hypotheses, the overall impact of managerial ownership on private benefits of control and on 
corporate performance at large is an empirical issue.  
Indeed, pros and cons of managerial ownership have been scrutinized in numerous 
empirical studies, but the available evidence is far from conclusive. For example, Core and 
Larcker (2002) find a positive association between managerial ownership and firm 
performance, McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a positive but decreasing relation, and 
Cheung, Wei and John (2006) find no relationship. A recent study by Benson and Davidson 
(2009) reports a significant inverted U-shaped relation similar to that found in the early 
research on this issue. This result is interpreted as suggesting incentive alignment at low 
levels and risk aversion at high levels of ownership by managers. A study by Masulis et al. 
(2009) suggests that managers with greater excess control rights over cash flow rights are 
more prone to pursue private benefits at shareholders’ expense, and explains why firm value 
is decreasing in insider excess control rights. 
  Overall, we expect to find support for the incentive alignment hypothesis, which 
implies a negative relationship between private benefits of control and CEO ownership. If, in 
addition, there are substantial entrenchment and risk aversion effects, we should observe this 
relationship either levelling off or changing the sign at higher levels of CEO ownership.   
 
  104.2. Age 
The literature usually links the effect of a CEO’s age on corporate performance to her career 
concerns (e.g., Holmstrom 1982; Gibbons and Murphy 1992) and decision horizon (e.g., 
Antia, Pantzalis and Park 2010). The career concerns literature offers two perspectives. One 
perspective, which can be found in Holmstrom (1982) and Scharfstein and Stein (1990) 
maintains that younger CEOs face higher risks when making decisions and may avoid radical 
actions. The other perspective, advanced by Prendergast and Stole (1996) suggests more 
conservatism on the part of older CEOs. The empirical evidence is mixed. Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999) find, for example, that younger managers of mutual funds hold less 
unsystematic risk and prefer more conventional portfolios. However, Li, Low and Makhija 
(2011) show that younger CEOs lead a “busy life” trying to establish their reputations in the 
market, while older CEOs seem to prefer an “easy life”. From the viewpoint of the career 
concerns literature, however, one could expect more opportunism on the part of older 
managers, who do not need to maintain reputation in the managerial labor market.  
The fact that managers’ decision horizons are shorter than shareholders’ investment 
horizons has been seen as an important source of corporate governance problems in firms 
(Jensen and Smith 1985). It has been suggested that CEOs with short decision horizon would 
pursue short-term objectives at the expense of long-run results that would be optimal for the 
firm’s shareholders. The argument may be extended to the case of private benefits of control: 
managers with short decision horizon are more likely to pursue own interests. However, 
CEOs close to retirement may also reduce their private benefits in order to improve firm 
performance, which may affect their retirement package (Kalyta 2009). Indeed, there is some 
evidence that older CEOs are more likely to engage in earnings management (Davidson et al. 
2007).  
A recent paper by Cole and Mehran (2009) studies determinants of executive 
compensation, including age, in privately held firms. This setup is interesting as in privately 
held firms, CEOs have nearly full control over their compensation. Cole and Mehran find a 
quadratic relationship between CEO age and pay, with maximum pay at 55 years of age. This 
finding is interpreted as stemming from greater conservatism and risk-aversion and/or lower 
consumption of older CEOs (the life-cycle consumption hypothesis), which makes them leave 
earnings in the firm rather than consume them through salary. But these interpretations need 
not necessarily hold for publicly traded firms where ownership is separated from control and 
CEOs cannot “store” their wealth in the firms.  
  11Overall, a CEO’s age appears to be an important determinant of her behavior, 
including the propensity to extract private benefits, but the exact relationship is hard to predict 




With respect to managers’ tenure, the dominant view in the literature is that CEOs staying 
longer at the top position of the firm have better opportunities for the extraction of private 
benefits of control. The principal mechanism behind this is the increase in the influence on the 
selection of new directors and greater control of the board (Hermalin and Weisbah 1998). 
Although the relevant empirical evidence is not very extensive, it tends to support the adverse 
effect of longer tenures of CEOs on corporate performance. For example, Ryan and Wiggins 
(2004) report that a CEO’s ability to influence the board of directors increases with his tenure, 
which leads to substantial agency problems in board governance.
4 In view of such evidence, 
Whitehead (2011) even raises the question of whether it could be beneficial to restrict CEO 
tenure in corporate law.   
Overall, with respect to CEO tenure (when it is isolated from CEO age), the literature 
is rather unambiguous and suggest that a CEO’s private benefits increase in her longevity in 
the firm. We therefore expect to see a positive association between private benefits of control 
and CEO tenure in our empirical analysis.  
 
4.4. Gender  
Groson and Gneezy (2009) identify three key characteristics of individuals that presumably 
differ by gender and may have important economic implications: risk preferences, social 
preferences, and reaction to competition. Their survey suggests that women are more risk 
averse than men, that the social preferences of women are more situational specific than those 
of men, and that women are neither more nor less socially oriented, but their social 
preferences are more compliant. Also, compared to men, women are more averse to 
competition. Some of the important results regarding gender differences have been obtained 
in the area of finance. For example, in the analysis of stock investments by men and women 
from 35,000 US households, Barber and Odean (2001) find that men trade 45 percent more 
                                                 
4  There is also extensive business literature suggesting that longer tenures may be associated with poorer 
performance (Musteen et al. 2006; Walters et al. 2007), for example, because of slower knowledge acquisition 
and resistance to change. Some of these factors can be seen as related to managers’ private benefits.  
  12than women. As stocks are considered the most risky investments among marketable 
securities, this result can be interpreted as suggesting less risk aversion on the part of men as 
compared with women. 
However, these differences need not necessarily apply to certain groups of the 
population, most notably, entrepreneurs, managers and professionals. While there are fewer 
women in senior positions in firms, they may have risk preferences similar to those of men 
because of the selection process (Johnson and Powell 1994; Atkinson, Baird and Frye 2003). 
   A number of studies evidence that the gender diversity of supervisory boards has a 
positive effect on corporate governance and performance. For example, Higgs (2003) 
contends that gender diversity could enhance board effectiveness and recommends that firms 
draw more actively from professional groups in which women are better represented. 
Westphal and Milton (2000) and Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) arrive at similar 
conclusions. A recent study by Adams and Ferreira (2009) shows that female directors have 
better attendance records than male directors, and that male directors have fewer attendance 
problems the more gender-diverse the supervisory board is. These results suggest that gender-
diverse boards allocate more effort to monitoring. Indeed, according to Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) more diverse boards are more likely to hold CEOs accountable for poor stock 
performance of the company, and CEO turnover is more sensitive to stock return performance 
in firms with relatively more women on boards.   
Drawing on the available theoretical and empirical literature we expect greater 
representation of women at the top of companies to have a negative or zero effect on private 
benefits of control.  
 
4.5. Size of corporate boards 
Theory also remains ambiguous about the optimal size of corporate boards. For example, a 
major advantage of large boards is seen in the greater collective information that the board 
possesses about factors affecting the value of firm (product markets, technology, regulation, 
mergers and acquisitions etc.). Thus, larger boards may be better in performing the advisory 
function (Dalton et al. 1999), one of the two key roles, in addition to the monitoring function, 
of corporate boards (Chen 2007). The major disadvantages of large boards are the 
coordination costs and free-rider problems (Jensen 1993). Harris and Raviv (2008) model the 
trade-off between the benefits of greater expertise that additional outside directors bring and 
the costs of an aggravated free-rider problem in order to identify the optimal number of 
outside directors on the board.  
  13The empirical evidence on the optimal size of boards is mixed. The influential study 
by Yermack (1996) suggests that small boards of directors are more effective than large 
boards. In particular, he finds an inverse relationship between board size and firm value 
measured by Tobin’s Q. Similar results are reported in Conyon and Peck (1998) and 
Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998). However, Beiner et al. (2004) and Lehn et al. (2009) 
find no robust relation between firm performance and board size. Moreover, Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) find a quadratic relationship suggesting the optimality of medium-sized 
boards in their study of banks in OECD countries. A recent paper by Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2008) shows that the relation between Tobin’s Q and board size is U-shaped, 
suggesting that small and large boards are better than medium-sized ones. However, the 
picture turns out to be more nuanced as the latter result stems from differences between 
simple and complex firms. Specifically, company performance increases in board size for 
complex firms and decreases for simple ones, with an important role played by the number of 
outside directors in both cases. 
We therefore do not advance any specific hypothesis concerning the optimal size of 
corporate boards. Answering this question requires an empirical study. 
 
4.6. Non-executive/independent directors  
The presence of non-executive and/or independent directors is one of the key characteristics 
of corporate boards. It has been widely assumed that more independent directors have less 
conflict of interests while monitoring managers and therefore may be more effective in 
performing this key role. However, it has also been noted (e.g., Lawrence and Stapledon 1999) 
that independent directors may not be good monitors because of social or political ties with 
the CEO (which could be the true even if the director meets all the usual criteria of 
independence) or because they simply do not have enough time due to other commitments. 
Different types of independent directors could perform differently, for example, CEOs of 
public companies may bring more valuable advice and be more effective in monitoring than 
directors who are appointed only for their public status and ties. 
Again, empirical studies show mixed results concerning the role of non-executive 
and/or independent directors. On the one hand, Weisbach (1988) finds that boards with higher 
proportion of outside directors are more likely to replace a CEO in case of poor corporate 
performance. A positive relationship between board independence and firm performance is 
also reported in Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) and Andres and Vallelado (2008). On the other 
hand, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) show that outside directors are associated with poorer 
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(1998). Bhagat and Black (2002) do not find any relationship between the presence of 
independent directors on the board and company performance. A recent study by Coles et al. 
(2008) shows that the role of independent directors depends on the level of complexity in 
firms. In particular, the share of inside directors has a positive effect on Tobin’s Q in 
“complex” (R&D-intensive) firms, where the firm-specific knowledge of insiders is more 
important, as compared with “simple” firms.  
All in all, whether the proportion of independent/non-executive directors in corporate 
boards has an effect on private benefits of control extracted by managers and/or controlling 
shareholders (and ultimately on corporate performance) is an empirical issue.  
 
5. Methodology 
In this paper, we relate key variables characterizing CEOs and supervisory boards to the 
voting premium, which is interpreted as a measure of private benefits of control. In the most 
general form, the corresponding econometric model can be written as follows: 
 
VPit = αi + Xitβ + Yitγ + Zitφ + δt  + εit                        (1) 
 
where subscripts i and t index firms and time, respectively, the dependent variable, VPit, is 
conventionally defined as the difference between the price of common shares (PCSh) and the 
price of preferred shares (PPSh) divided by the price of preferred shares
5, αi is a time-invariant 
firm-specific effect (which captures unobserved characteristics of firm i), vector Xit includes 
essential characteristics of CEOs, such as age, gender, and tenure in the firm, vector Yit 
contains characteristics of the firm’s supervisory board, including size, ownership stake, and 
gender composition
6, vector Z it includes additional conventional control variables, such as 
                                                 
5 An important advantage of the dependent variable chosen is that it helps eliminate from the analysis the effect 
of many firm-specific and industry-specific shocks, which impact on traditional measures of corporate 
performance, such as Tobin’s Q. To give an example, a substantial increase in oil prices is likely to positively 
affect the values of both common and preferred shares of the oil sector companies. As the computation of the 
voting premium uses the difference between the prices of the two classes of stock, much of the effect of 
increased oil prices is differenced away. This is not the case with Tobin’s Q. An oil price rally would raise 
Tobin’s Q of companies belonging to the oil extraction industry relative to firms from other sectors. Obviously, 
such an increase has nothing to do with better corporate governance in the oil sector companies.   
6 Russian companies have a two-tier structure of corporate boards, with management and supervisory boards 
separated from each other. In what follows, we focus on supervisory boards only. In most Russian companies the 
CEO has the power of the sole executive body and members of the management board are typically elected by 
  15firm size, δt denote time effects common to all firms, and εit stands for a random disturbance. 
In this specification, vectors of coefficients β and γ  are of our primary interest. 
Theoretical models suggest, however, that the voting premium, if taken at face value, 
provides only an imperfect measure of the private benefits. Indeed, the model by Zingales 
(1995) shows that the voting premium is affected, in addition to the private benefits of control, 
by the likelihood of a control fight over the firm as well as by the proportion of voting shares 
in the company’s equity (see Appendix 1). In fact, Doidge (2004) mentions this as a key 
shortcoming of the voting premium as a measure of private benefits. 
  While some authors have considered, based on various assumptions, several 
adjustments to the traditional definition of the voting premium in order to make it closer to the 
true value of private benefits (see, e.g., Nenova 2003 and Doidge 2004), our approach is 
different. We use the key variables identified in the theoretical work by Zingales as additional 
controls in regressions. The idea here is to eliminate any potential spurious correlation 
between the voting premium on the one hand and CEO and board characteristics on the other 
hand if these latter factors are correlated, for whatever reason, with other determinants of the 
voting premium, such as the likelihood of a control fight over the firm. This is also a more 
traditional approach in the literature. Indeed, according to Albuquerque and Schrot (2010, 
p.33) “[c]urrent approaches to estimating private benefits of control rely on empirical proxies, 
such as the block premium or the voting premium, and on the use of control variables to 
remove from these proxies aspects unrelated to private benefits of control”. 
  We therefore augment model (1) with additional control variables that include a proxy 
for the probability of a control fight, the proportion of voting shares in the company’s equity, 
and a measure of liquidity.
7 Finally, given some variation in the characteristics of Russian 
preferred shares across companies, we add several control variables specific to the Russian 
case. These include dummy variables for the temporary enfranchisement of preferred shares 
and compulsory allocation of 10 percent on net profit to dividends on preferred shares, among 
other factors (see Muravyev 2009a for details). With these modifications, the baseline 
regression model transforms into: 
                                                                                                                                                          
the supervisory board following the recommendation of the CEO. The CEO and supervisory board are therefore 
the key players in the corporate governance game while the management board appears to be of secondary 
importance (and also clearly endogenous with respect to the CEO and supervisory board). 
7 Although stock liquidity is usually not a part of theoretical models of the voting premium, it is almost always 
included in empirical analyses (e.g., Nenova 2003 and Neumann 2003). As shown in the contributions by Stoll 
and Whaley (1983) and Amihud and Mendelson (1986), higher liquidity ceteris paribus contributes to higher 
prices. Therefore, the voting premium may be affected by different liquidity of the two classes of stock.  
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VPit = αi + Xitβ + Yitγ + Zitφ +Witψ + δt  + εit                      (2) 
 
where vector Wit includes the mentioned additional controls (variables from standard analyses 
of the voting premium as well as those specific to the Russian case) and the other notations 
are the same as in (1). 
  Our regression model includes the time-invariant firm-specific effect  αi which 
captures unobserved characteristics of firm i. This is done in order to mitigate endogeneity 
concerns, specifically those arising when some of the characteristics of CEOs and corporate 
boards are correlated with omitted characteristics of firms (which, in turn, affect the voting 
premium). However, we acknowledge that fixed-effects specifications like (1) and (2) do not 
necessarily eliminate all potential problems related to regressor endogeneity. In particular, this 
approach does not address the issues of measurement error and reversed causation. We 
therefore admit that the estimated coefficients may not necessarily have a causal 
interpretation.
8  
  Another issue is that the fixed-effects estimator uses only the within variation in the 
data and ignores the between variation. As a result, the coefficients on time-invariant 
repressors cannot be estimated. Worse, the estimator provides very imprecise estimates when 
the within variation in the data exists, but is very tiny (driven by a few firms only) and partly 
reflects noise in the data. This point is important for the interpretation of our results.
9   
  As regards standard errors, we perform estimations using the cluster robust estimator 
of variance with clustering by firms. This takes care of potential violations of the iid 
assumption regarding the standard errors εit (independently and identically distributed errors). 
In particular, it ensures the calculation of correct standard errors when observations within 
firm i are correlated in some unknown way, resulting in correlation in εit within i. 
 
6. Data and sample 
Our analysis is based on a novel hand-collected dataset of publicly traded Russian companies 
that have issued dual class stocks. Specifically, the sample embraces all companies whose 
                                                 
8 Addressing this problem would require finding instruments for a whole bunch of variables related to CEOs and 
boards, which is virtually impossible in an exploratory study like ours. 
9 The random-effects estimator, which is the main alternative to the fixed-effects estimator, uses not only the 
within variation, but also the between variation in the data. It makes, however, a rather restrictive assumption 
that firm effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors, which is usually very difficult to justify. Looking 
ahead, the Hausman specification test rejects the RE estimator in most of the specifications used in our study.   
  17common and preferred shares were traded in the RTS Stock Exchange between 1997 and 
2009.
10 The choice of the RTS (and not MICEX or any other stock exchange) is motivated by 
the wider coverage of the RTS, with more than 50 dual class stock companies listed and 
traded there as early as the late 1990s.
11  
The RTS data on share trade, which are downloadable from the RTS web-site 
(http://www.rts.ru), are supplemented with information on ownership, characteristics of shares 
from companies’ quarterly reports to the Federal Financial Market Service (FFMS, previously 
the Federal Commission on Securities Market). These data have been assembled from the 
SKRIN and SPARK databases (www.skrin.ru,  http://spark.interfax.ru) which collect and 
process original reports submitted by Russian joint-stock companies to the FFMS and 
statistical agencies. 
  These sources provide a large array of variables characterizing various aspects of 
firms’ operations. In particular, there is information on the distribution of ownership among 
large shareholders (the reporting threshold in Russia is 5 percent), ownership stakes of 
affiliated persons (including CEO and other directors, regardless of the size of their stakes)
12, 
and composition of corporate boards (including name, age, tenure, and previous positions 
during the five year period). In addition, they provide information about industry affiliation, 
number of employees, and key financial variables of the firms. Using these various sources, 
we have assembled a database that contains most important variables characterizing corporate 
ownership patterns, size and composition of corporate supervisory boards, as well as 
characteristics of managers, in accordance with the discussion in the methodology section. 
Overall, the database is an unbalanced annual panel of more than 200 firms during 13 years 
(1997-2009) with over 1000 observations in total. The definition of the key variables, which 
we use in the empirical analysis, is provided in Table 1 below. Table 2 shows the descriptive 
statistics for these variables. Further details concerning the calculation of the voting premium, 
Shapley value, and liquidity variables are available in Appendix 2.  
                                                 
10 The distinction between “listed” and “traded” is important in the Russian context. In 2001, for example, there 
were over 150 companies with dual class shares listed in the RTS. However, in any quarter of 2001, the number 
of companies with reported transactions involving both types of stock was less than half of this number.  
11 The choice of a particular exchange has major implications for the measurement of liquidity, an important 
control variable in our analysis, especially when the latter is based on trade volumes data. The implications for 
the measurement of stock prices are less important as cross-market differences in prices are being consistently 
eliminated by arbitrageurs.  
12  The disclosure standards adopted in Russia do not generally allow identification of complex ownership 
structures, such as family ownership or pyramidal ownership. This is certainly a limitation of the data we use.  
  18Table 1. Definitions of variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
 Variable Description 
 Dependent  variable 
VP  Voting premium (calculated based on the average ask and bid prices over May-August 
for each year).* 
  Vector X variables 
CEO_ownersh  Share of CEO in the firm’s equity, percent. 
CEO _tenure  CEO tenure in the firm, full years. 
CEO _age  Age of CEO, years. 
CEO _gender  Dummy for CEO gender (1 stands for male and 0 for female). 
  Vector Y variables 
BRD_no_direct  Supervisory board size, number of people. 
BRD_a_ownersh  Average share of the board members in the firm’s equity, percent. 
BRD_nonex_share  Share of non-executive directors. 
BRD_male_share Share  of  men  in the supervisory board. 
BRD_a_age  Average age of the members of corporate boards, years. 
CHAIR_ownersh  Ownership stake of the Chairman, percent. 
CHAIR_age  Age of  the Chairman, years. 
CHAIR_gender  Dummy for the Chairman’s gender (1 stands for male and 0 for female). 
 Vector  Z  variables 





Industry variables: power stands for power utilities, fuels stands for oil&gas firms, 
chemic denotes chemistry, machin is a dummy for machine building, telecm stands for 
transport and communications (mostly telecoms), wsales stands for sales (mostly 
electricity distribution companies), and other include all remaining industries. 
  Vector W variables 
SHAPLEY  Shapley value; characterizes the extent to which a small atomistic shareholder can be 
pivotal in a control fight over the firm.* 
SHARE_VOTING  Share of common (voting) stocks in equity. 
DIV10  Dummy for the presence of the 10% dividend rule on preferred shares.(does the 
corporate charter requires the firm to pay 10% of net profit as dividend on pref. 
shares? 0=No, 1=Yes). 
ADR  Dummy for the issue of ADR (has the firm issued any ADR? 0=No, 1=Yes). 
VOTE  Dummy for enfranchisement of preferred shares in the current year, occurs when the 
company did not pay dividends on pref. shares in the previous year (are the preferred 
shares of the firm voting in the current year? 0=No, 1=Yes). 
VETO  Dummy for the existence of the veto power for preferred shareholders.(equals 1, if the 
corporate charter includes the veto power, 0 – otherwise). 
LIQUIDITY_comm  The variable measures the liquidity of common stocks (calculated as 
average_bid/average_ask over May-August for each year. The closer this variable to 1, 
the more liquid the stock is. When it is close to 0, the stock is illiquid).* 
LIQUIDITY_pref The  variable  measures the liquidity of preferred stocks (calculated as 
average_bid/average_ask over May-August for each year. The closer this variable to 1, 
the more liquid the stock is. When it’s close to 0, the stock is illiquid).*  
Note: * See details in Appendix 2.  
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Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
VP  1.13 0.94 -0.12 5.12 
CEO_ownersh 0.40  1.05 0  13.68 
CEO _tenure  3.60  3.29  0  25 
CEO _age  51.21  8.17  30  70 
CEO _gender  0.99  0.08  0  1 
BRD_no_directors 8.09  2.13  5  18 
BRD_av_ownersh  0.08  0.46 0 8.88 
BRD_nonex_share 0.76  0.21  0  1 
BRD_male_share 0.86  0.15  0.33  1 
BRD_av_age 44.86  5.91  28  63.17 
CHAIR_ownersh  0.09  0.65 0 8.38 
CHAIR_age 47.86  11.45  24  74 
CHAIR_gender 0.88  0.32  0  1 
SIZE 8.53  1.30  4.06  11.71 
POWER   0.31  0.46  0  1 
FUELS 0.14  0.35  0  1 
CHEMIC 0.02  0.16  0  1 
MACNIN 0.04  0.21  0  1 
TELECOM 0.37  0.48  0  1 
WSALES 0.04  0.19  0  1 
OTHER 0.08  0.27  0  1 
SHAPLEY  0.04  0.12 0 0.84 
SHARE_VOTING  0.79 0.06 0.75 0.99 
DIV10 0.90  0.29  0  1 
ADR 0.21  0.40  0  1 
VOTE 0.13  0.34  0  1 
VETO 0.70  0.46  0  1 
LIQUIDITY_comm  0.65 0.27 0.01 0.99 
LIQUIDITY_pref  0.55 0.30 0.01 0.99 
Note: The number of observations for most variables is 1009. Only in a few 
cases it drops to just below 1000 (for example, BRD_av_ownersh has 974 non-
missing values and CHAIR_ownersh has 989 values).  
 
The data in Table 2 show that the average voting premium for the whole period of observation 
is equal to 1.13 or 113 percent. This is large by international standards.
13 The premium has 
also varied over time, being considerably higher in the crisis periods as compared with other 
years (see Table 3). Concerning the distribution of the voting premium, it is largely confined 
to the interval between 0 and 5 (from zero to 500 percent). Only 1 percent of the observations 
of the voting premium exceed the threshold of 500 percent, and only in 2 percent of cases we 
see negative values.
14 A closer look at the proportion of companies with dual class stock listed 
                                                 
13 For example, the voting premium is 46% in Israel (Levy 1983), 13% in the UK (Megginson 1990), 20% in 
Switzerland (Horner 1988), and 23% in Germany (Hoffmann-Burchardi 1999). Among mature stock markets, 
the largest premium, about 82%, is found in Italy (Zingales 1994). 
14 Negative values of the voting premium (which are, strictly speaking, in conflict with finance theory) are 
occasionally found in other stock markets, e.g., in Denmark and Norway. Odegaard (2007) attributes the long 
existence of negative voting premia in Norway to regulatory restrictions on foreign ownership. Once those 
restrictions were lifted the premium became positive. Neumann (2003) suggests that negative voting premium in 
  20on the RTS as well as at the trading activity involving dual class stock companies (not shown) 
suggests that dual class stock companies in Russia are a declining phenomenon. This trend 
largely stems from mergers and acquisitions involving dual class stock firms as well as from 
very infrequent issue of non-voting stock by both new entrants to the stock market and the 
existing single class stock firms.
15  
 
Table 3. Dynamics of the voting premium, 1997-2009. 
 
Year Mean  Median  N 
1997 0.915  0.958  19 
1998 1.287  1.134  104 
1999 2.088  1.780  71 
2000 1.739  1.623  107 
2001 1.537  1.407  119 
2002 0.901  0.920  120 
2003 0.831  0.772  64 
2004 0.621  0.507  62 
2005 0.795  0.552  60 
2006 0.402  0.307  87 
2007 0.689  0.474  93 
2008 1.294  0.948  58 
2009 1.072  0.620  45 
Total 1.128  0.906  1009 
 
The data in Table 2 also show that most of the sampled firms are large and extra large 
companies (with more than 4000 employees on average), and belong to three industries: 
power utilities, oil & gas industry, and telecommunications. This is hardly a surprise given the 
specifics of privatization of these sectors in the 1990s (see Hare and Muravyev 2003). 
The CEOs of the sampled firms are, on average, 51 years old
16, work in the current 
positions for 3.6 years and have fairly small ownership stakes amounting, on average, to 0.4 
percent only (the maximum is 13.7 percent). There are only a handful of female CEOs in the 
sampled companies. 
                                                                                                                                                          
Denmark stems from a liquidity discount. In Denmark, the number of outstanding shares with superior voting 
rights is much lower than the number of stocks with inferior control rights, implying a lower free float of 
(superior) voting shares. 
15 The erosion of the dual class stock firms is also a characteristic of mature stock markets. Here, however, the 
principal mechanism appears to be the unification of different classes of shares (Pajuste 2005). Evidence of such 
unification can be found, for example, in Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001) for Canada, and in Hauser and 
Lauterbach (2003) for Israel. 
16 The variation in the sample is substantial: there are very young managers aged 30, but also very experienced 
ones aged well above 60, which is the usual retirement age for men in Russia. 
  21The supervisory boards have, on average, eight directors. The directors hold no or 
very small fractions of equity in the firms, less than 0.1 percent on average. Most of the 
directors sitting on the supervisory boards are non-executive. As compared with CEOs, they 
are considerably younger (45 years on average, with many members aged between 26 and 30) 
and nearly 15 percent of them are women. The Chairmen of supervisory boards are somewhat 
older (48 years) and hold larger stakes in their firms (0.16 percent). Nearly 12 percent of them 
are females. The gender statistics therefore show greater presence of women at lower levels of 
the corporate hierarchy – almost none among the CEOs, a significant number among the 
Chairmen, and even larger fraction among the supervisory board members. 
The overwhelming majority of the sampled companies have controlling shareholders, 
which results in low Shapley values in the whole sample (by definition, the Shapley value is 
equal to zero if a firm has a controlling owner).
17 The shareholder capital of the sampled firms 
consists, on average, of 21 percent preferred shares and 79 percent common shares (variable 
SHARE_VOTING). Common shares appear to be somewhat more liquid than preferred 
shares as variables LIQUIDITY_comm and LIQUIDITY_pref suggest.  
In order to get an idea about the evolution of corporate governance in Russia we now 
turn to the comparison of the key variables between 1999 and 2009. Both years chosen are 
post-crisis years, which ensures that we compare firms in two similar environments. The 
substantial time span between the two periods allows us to capture important dynamic aspects. 
The descriptive statistics for the 1999 and 2009 sub-samples are presented in Table 4. In 
addition, Table 4 shows the differences in means and p-values from a double-sided t-test for 
the equality of means between the two sub-samples. 
Table 5 supplements these statistics with more details about the evolution of key 
characteristics of CEOs and corporate boards on the year-by-year basis. Panel A reports the 
means and Panel B – the medians of the variables selected. Medians are important in view of 
the large number of observations with zero values in some variables, such as ownership by 
CEOs and board members. By looking at the medians, one can identify, for example, the time 
when the majority of companies became headed by CEOs without any ownership.  
We first make a clarifying point about some differences in the industry affiliation 
between the 1999 and 2009 sub-samples (implying, more generally, a considerable 
unbalancedness of the panel) which are apparent from Table 4. To a large extent, these 
differences reflect the reorganization of the two largest industries in our sample, namely, 
telecoms and power utilities, which was initiated by government. In the late 1990s, virtually 
                                                 
17 These descriptive statistics are very much in line with those from other studies of corporate governance in 
Russia, e.g., Kuznetsov and Muravyev (2001), Muravyev (2003), Iwasaki (2008), and Pöyry and Maury (2010). 
  22all regions of Russia (89 at the time) had an own telecom and power utility company, which 
was a heritage of the privatization program (see Hare and Muravyev 2003). In 2001-2002, 
most regional telecoms were reorganized into several larger companies. Vertically integrated 
regional power utilities were instead split into power generation, power distribution, and 
wholesale companies in 2004-2005, with some horizontal mergers following thereafter. 
Changes in firm size reflect these mergers and spin-offs, and to some extent, the general 
downsizing of Russian firms. Overall, we believe that changes in the sample due to these 
government-initiated sectoral reforms had little to do with private benefits of control and are 
therefore not important (ignorable) in our analysis. More generally, as the causes of missing 
observations do not appear to be endogenous to the model, the unbalancedness of the panel is 
not an issue in our analysis. 
 
Table 4. Comparison of the 1999 and 2009 sub-samples. 
 
Variable  Mean  St.D. Min Max Mean  St.D. Min Max Diff p-value 
VP  2.09 1.49 -0.01 5.12 1.07 1.01 -0.12 3.92 -1.02  0.000 
CEO_ownersh  0.48  0.76 0 4.66  0.03  0.09 0 0.55  -0.45  0.000 
CEO_tenure  4.38  3.35 0  25  2.82  3.52 0  15  -1.56  0.018 
CEO_age  54.52  8.29 33  70  48.51  9.47 33  69 -6.01  0.000 
CEO_gender  1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 n/a 
BRD_no_directors  8.20  2.48 6  18  9 1.89 6  14 0.80  0.066 
BRD_av_ownersh 0.06  0.10 0 0.65  0.09  0.49 0 3.27  0.03  0.575 
BRD_nonex_share  0.65 0.18 0.13  1  0.87 0.17 0.17  1  0.22  0.000 
BRD_male_share  0.88 0.12 0.50  1  0.81 0.15 0.40  1  -0.07 0.011 
BRD_av_age  48.02 4.06 38.81  57.67  42.64 7.23 28.78  63.17 -5.39  0.000 
CHAIR_ownersh  0.01  0.05 0 0.30  0.18  0.49 0 1.85  0.16  0.006 
CHAIR_age  49.44  11.08 27  73 44.84  10.29 26  66 -4.59 0.027 
CHAIR_gender  0.90  0.30 0  1 0.87  0.34 0  1 -0.03  0.567 
SIZE  9.11 0.90 6.96  11.70  8.23 1.48 5.53  11.46  -0.88 0.000 
POWER    0.17  0.38 0  1 0.29  0.46 0  1 0.12  0.128 
FUELS  0.17  0.38 0  1 0.16  0.37 0  1 -0.01  0.850 
CHEMIC  0.03  0.17 0  1 0.07  0.25 0  1 0.04  0.324 
MACNIN  0.07  0.26 0  1 0.02  0.15 0  1 -0.05  0.257 
TELECOM 0.49  0.50  0  1 0.22  0.42 0  1 -0.27  0.003 
WSALES  0  0  0  0 0.11  0.32 0  1 0.11  0.004 
OTHER  0.07  0.26 0  1 0.13  0.34 0  1 0.06  0.264 
SHAPLEY  0.06  0.17 0 0.74  0.06  0.15 0 0.82  0.00  0.986 
SHARE_VOTING  0.77 0.04 0.75 0.95 0.81 0.07 0.75 0.99 0.04  0.000 
DIV10  0.96  0.20 0  1 0.87  0.34 0  1 -0.09  0.075 
ADR  0.20  0.40 0  1 0.29  0.46 0  1 0.09  0.259 
VOTE  0.11  0.32 0  1 0.18  0.39 0  1 0.07  0.326 
VETO  0.28  0.45  0 1 1 0 1 1  0.72  0.000 
LIQUIDITY_comm 0.46 0.29 0.01 0.99 0.54 0.34 0.02 0.98 0.08  0.193 
LIQUIDITY_pref  0.29 0.26 0.01 0.98 0.45 0.32 0.01 0.95 0.16  0.004 
 
The data in Table 4 show that CEO share declined between 1999 and 2009, with the 
test for the equality of means indicating statistically significant difference at the 1 percent 
level. CEO tenure declined too, from 4.4 years to mere 2.8 years; the difference is statistically 
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significant at the 5 percent level.
18 There was a substantial drop in CEO age, from 54.5 to 48.5 
years, significant at the 1 percent level. Interestingly, there was not any woman occupying the 
position of CEO in the sampled companies in either year. 
The data also suggest a slight increase in the size of corporate boards, a substantial 
increase in the share of non-executive directors, and a large drop in the average age of 
directors, including Chairmen. Somewhat counter-intuitively, the data show an increase in the 
ownership stakes of Chairmen, although the average stake of directors did not change.  
As to other variables, there was an increase in the share of common stock in the firms’ 
equity as well as an increase in the liquidity of preferred stocks (both significant at the 1 
percent level). The change in variable VETO merely reflects the 2001 change in corporate law, 
which gave preferred shareholders the power to veto unfavorable changes in corporate 
charters (see Muravyev, 2009b). 
The additional data in Table 5 indeed confirm the downward trends in CEO ownership, 
CEO tenure, and CEO age. They also confirm that female CEOs are indeed exceptions in the 
sample, with a few women occupying the top positions in 2006-2008 only. The data suggest 
no clear dynamics for the size of corporate boards in Russia, albeit the data in Table 4 showed 
some increase. However, the shift towards higher proportion of non-executive directors that 
we saw in Table 4 appears to be a part of the general trend. There is also a clear tendency 
towards younger boards (including Chairmen) in more recent years. No particular tendency is 
seen in the Chairman’s ownership stake, in contrast to the comparison of the data from 1999 
and 2009 in Table 4. The latter result was apparently driven by the fluctuations in the sample 
composition. Overall, the detailed statistics in Table 5 are very much in line with the 
comparison of the two sub-samples in Table 4 and confirm a number of strong trends in the 




18 The reorganization of power utilities in the mid-2000s is the primary reason for a considerable drop in CEO 
tenure in 2006-2007 which is reported in Table 5.  Table 5. Dynamics of CEO and board characteristics. 
 
Panel A. Means of variables. 
    Variable/  Year 1997 1998                          1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
CEO_ownersh  0.62                            0.62 0.48 0.59 0.71 0.65 0.16 0.14 0.2 0.14 0.1 0.16 0.03 0.4
CEO_tenure  4.37                           
                           
                      
                           
                       
                           
                           
                     
                           
                           
                           
3.54 4.38 4.28 4.33 4.63 3.81 3.84 3.27 2.54 1.77 2.59 2.82 3.6
CEO_age  53.8 53.7 54.5 54.1 52.5 52.2 49.8 50.4 49.8 48.3 47.5 48.4 48.5 51.2
CEO_gender  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.99  0.98  0.95 1 0.99





BRD_av_ownersh  0.05 0.17 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0 0.09 0.08
BRD_nonex_share  0.74 0.62 0.65 0.63 0.7 0.75 0.78 0.8 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.85 0.87 0.76
BRD_male_share  0.92 0.87 0.88
 
0.87 0.84 0.82 0.91
 
0.91 0.87 0.83 0.85 0.86
 
0.81 0.86
BRD_av_age  50.4 49.1 48 47.9 45.8 45.1 44 43.5 44.1 41.3 41.1 42 42.6 44.9
CHAIR_ownersh  0.11 0.12 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.07 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.09
CHAIR_age  53.5 52.5 49.4 51.8 48.2 48.2 48.6 47.6 48.1 43.9 43.4 42.8 44.8 47.9
CHAIR_gender  0.92 0.91 0.9 0.79 0.8 0.82 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.92 0.91 0.95 0.87 0.88
 
Panel B. Medians of variables. 
    Variable/  Year 1997 1998                          1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
CEO_ownersh  0.43  0.21  0.17                   0.2 0.16  0.11  0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01
CEO_tenure  3                          
                           
                           
                           
                  
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
4 5 5 5 4.5 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 3
CEO_age  53 53.5 54 53 52 53 51 51 51 48 49 49 47 52
CEO_gender  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BRD_no_directors  8 6 8 6 6 6 8 8 9 8 9 9 9 8
BRD_av_ownersh  0.03  0.05  0.01  0.04  0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BRD_nonex_share  0.71 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.75 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.88 0.9 0.88 0.9 0.83
BRD_male_share  0.96 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.83 0.87 0.96 0.9 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.88
BRD_av_age  51.3 48.9 47.6 48.5 45.7 44.8 43.8 43 43.4 40.4 40.8 41.7 42.7 45.3
CHAIR_ownersh  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CHAIR_age  56 51 49 53 46 46 46 47 48 44 43 41 42 47
CHAIR_gender  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 7. Empirical results 
Our approach to testing the main research hypotheses is the following. We start with the most 
parsimonious baseline specification that contains only one key variable characterizing the 
firm’s CEO, namely, her ownership stake. Then we consider the quadratic specification in 
CEO ownership. Next, we sequentially add other key variables of interest, starting with 
additional characteristics of the CEO and finishing with characteristics of the corporate board 
and Chairman. Again, we start with the linear specification and then test for the quadratic 
relationship. All estimates reported in the paper are obtained using the fixed-effects estimator.  
Table 6 shows the fist set of results for CEO characteristics.
19 Column 1 reports results 
for the effect of CEO ownership on the private benefits of control using a linear specification. 
The coefficient of interest turns to be statistically insignificant. Column 2 shows the results 
for a non-linear specification, where the effect of CEO ownership is assumed to be quadratic. 
The coefficients of interest remain insignificant when taken separately, but are jointly 
significant at the 10 percent level (p-value 0.0543, not reported in the table). We next 
augment the model with CEO tenure in years (Column 3). The newly included variable enters 
the model with a positive, albeit marginally statistically insignificant coefficient. The 
magnitude of the coefficients on CEO ownership (as well as on its quadratic term) changes 
somewhat, suggesting correlation between CEO ownership and tenure. Column 4 reports the 
results for a quadratic specification in CEO tenure. The coefficient on CEO tenure remains 
positive and becomes statistically significant at the 5 percent level, while the coefficient on 
the quadratic term is negative, but insignificant. We interpret this result as evidence that CEO 
tenure has a positive, albeit diminishing effect on the private benefits of control. The 
estimated coefficients on CEO ownership variables now suggest a minimum of private 
benefits at CEO ownership of about 3.7 percent. This turning point is between the 95
th and 
99
th percentiles of the distribution of CEO ownership in the sample, therefore the right branch 
of the parabola is somewhat difficult to interpret (we discuss this issue later, after examining 
additional specifications). Columns 5 and 6 report the results for linear and quadratic 
specifications in CEO age. The results suggest non-linearity in the effect of CEO age on the 
private benefits of control – the minimum is achieved when CEOs are about 51 years of age, 
which is close to the average in the sample. Note that due to the very small number of female 
CEOs in our sample (and, apparently, in Russia in general) we cannot say anything about the 
effect of CEO gender on private benefits of control.  
 
                                                 
19 The table reports only those coefficients which are of primary interest in our study. A table with full results is 
available in Appendix 3.  Table 6. Estimation results for key characteristics of CEOs.  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
CEO ownersh 0.0103  -0.1170 -0.1886 -0.2143* -0.2010 -0.2251*
 (0.0380)  (0.1170) (0.1253) (0.1246) (0.1269) (0.1263)
CEO ownersh
2   0.0174 0.0258* 0.0287** 0.0278*  0.0300**
   (0.0134) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0147)  (0.0146)
CEO _tenure   0.0179 0.0441** 0.0553***  0.0505**
   (0.0117) (0.0209) (0.0204)  (0.0198)
CEO tenure
2   -0.0022 -0.0023*  -0.0027**
   (0.0013) (0.0014)  (0.0013)
CEO _age   -0.0062  -0.1321**
   (0.0053)  (0.0520)
CEO age
2     0.0013**
     (0.0005)
r2  .37 .37 .37 .37 .37 .38
p  2.57e-39 5.54e-40 6.54e-41 1.62e-41 7.64e-40 1.08e-42
N  1007 1007 1007 1007 1004 1004
Note: The table shows only the key variables of interest. For full results, see Appendix 3. The dependent variable 
is the voting premium, VP. The results are obtained using the fixed-effects estimator. Cluster-robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
As to the control variables, most of them enter the regressions with the right sign and 
many are statistically significant (see Appendix 3). The coefficient on the Shapley value 
(variable SHAPLEY), for example, is positive (which is consistent with theory), albeit 
marginally statistically insignificant. This may be due to the fact that most variation in the 
Shapley value is across firms and not over time, as ownership of firms does not change much 
on the year-by-year basis. However, as the fixed effect estimator ignores all the between 
variation in the data, estimation loses precision. The coefficients on the liquidity variables 
LIQUIDITY_comm and LIQUIDITY_pref have the right signs and are highly statistically 
significant. In particular, the results suggest a decrease in the voting premium due to higher 
liquidity of preferred stocks, and an increase in the premium due to higher liquidity of 
common shares. We also observe large and statistically significant time effects, mirroring the 
dynamics of the voting premium in the raw data (see Table 3).
 20 
The next set of results is shown in Table 7. We sequentially add variables 
characterizing the size of supervisory boards, average ownership stakes of directors, as well as 
presence of non-executive directors in firms. As before, we explore both linear and quadratic 
specifications. Column 1 shows the results for a linear specification in board size. The 
                                                 
20 We use the FE estimator as specification tests usually do not support the pooled OLS and RE estimators. In 
Appendix 4 we show the results of the RE estimation mirroring the FE results just discussed. The Breusch and 
Pagan test (unambiguously) suggests the presence of unobserved firm-level effects; the Hausman test rejects the 
consistency of the RE estimator in three out of six cases while in the other three cases it does not reject on the 
margin. Given that the Hausman test has low power (often does not reject when it should), we focus on the FE 
results. 
  27coefficient on the newly added variable is statistically insignificant. In Column 2 we test a 
quadratic specification in board size. The two variables of interest are statistically significant, 
suggesting a parabolic relationship with a dip in private benefits of control at board size of 
about nine directors. This is slightly above the average in the sample and given the large range 
of variable BRD_no_directors we can interpret the result as suggesting the optimality of 
medium-sized boards (as opposed to both very large and very small ones). The specifications 
in Columns 3 and 4 test the importance of the average shareholding of board members. 
Neither the linear specification (Column 3) nor the quadratic one (Column 4) suggests any 
effect, however. The coefficients on the other variables of interests are barely affected. In 
Columns 5 and 6 we test the importance of non-executive directors in corporate supervisory 
boards. The results show no statistically significant relationship between private benefits of 
control and the share of non-executive directors, regardless of the specification used. This 
exercise does not lead to any important changes in the other coefficients of interest. In 
particular, we still observe (see Column 6) a dip in private benefits of control when CEO 
ownership reaches about 3.9 percent, a positive, albeit diminishing relationship between CEO 
tenure and private benefits of control (the estimates suggest a parabola with the peak of 
private benefits at 8.6 years of CEO tenure, which is between the 90
th and 95
th percentiles of 
the distribution), and very well-defined parabolas in CEO age and board size. In particular, 
the minimum of private benefits obtains at CEO age of about 53 years and board of directors 
consisting of 9.6 people. 
  28Table 7. Estimation results for key characteristics of CEOs and boards.  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
CEO ownersh -0.2241*  -0.2395* -0.2537** -0.2379** -0.2018* -0.2015*
 (0.1256)  (0.1226) (0.1222) (0.1179) (0.1219) (0.1212)
CEO ownersh
2  0.0295** 0.0301** 0.0316** 0.0300** 0.0263*  0.0263*
 (0.0145)  (0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0138) (0.0140) (0.0139)
CEO _tenure  0.0489** 0.0449** 0.0459** 0.0461** 0.0459** 0.0459**
 (0.0198)  (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0204) (0.0201)
CEO tenure
2  -0.0029** -0.0026* -0.0026* -0.0027* -0.0027* -0.0027*
 (0.0014)  (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015)
CEO _age -0.1418***  -0.1384** -0.1406** -0.1393** -0.1363** -0.1363**
 (0.0541)  (0.0543) (0.0544) (0.0545) (0.0551) (0.0553)
CEO age
2  0.0014** 0.0013** 0.0014** 0.0013** 0.0013** 0.0013**
 (0.0005)  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
RD_no_directors 0.0242  -0.2523** -0.2931** -0.2901** -0.3019**  -0.3016***
 (0.0312)  (0.1194) (0.1204) (0.1208) (0.1163) (0.1152)
RD no directors
2   0.0135** 0.0152** 0.0151** 0.0158***  0.0158***
   (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0057)  (0.0057)
BRD_av_ownersh   0.0058 -0.1261 -0.1331  -0.1335
   (0.0616) (0.2678) (0.2688)  (0.2694)
BRD av ownersh
2   0.0141 0.0147  0.0147
   (0.0236) (0.0237)  (0.0237)
BRD_nonex_share   0.1238  0.1466
   (0.2255)  (0.8298)
BRD nonex share
2     -0.0184
     (0.6017)
r2  .38 .39 .39 .39 .39 .39
p  5.74e-41 2.97e-42 7.14e-42 1.57e-42 5.52e-42 3.97e-42
N  980 980 969 969 951 951
Note: The table shows only the key variables of interest. The dependent variable is the voting premium, VP. The 
results are obtained using the fixed-effects estimator. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 8 shows the results for additional specifications in which we look at the effect of 
the gender and age composition of corporate boards, as well as at several characteristics of 
Chairmen. Columns 1 and 2 display the results for the proportion of male directors on 
corporate boards. Neither the linear specification nor the quadratic one delivers statistically 
significant relationships. Columns 3 and 4 present the results for the effect of the average age 
of board members on the private benefits of control. The linear specification shown in 
Column 3 suggests a negative effect of age on private benefits: the older the directors, the 
smaller the private benefits. The quadratic specification shown in Column 4 shows 
insignificant coefficients on the two variables of interest. However, they are jointly significant 
at the 5 percent level (p-value 0.0378, not shown in the table). This is one of the two cases 
throughout our analysis when a linear specification is preferred to a quadratic one. The 
regressions in Columns 5 and 6, in which we explore the effect of the Chairman’s 
characteristics (ownership stake, age, and gender), are therefore linear in the average age of 
board members. The results in Column 5 suggest a positive effect of the ownership stake held 
by the Chairman on the private benefits. The results reported in Column 6 do not support the 
  29quadratic specification in the Chairman’s ownership stake, however. The effect of ownership 
by the Chairman is considerably smaller (in absolute value) than the effect of CEO ownership, 
but a striking feature is the positive sign of the coefficient on CHAIR_ownersh variable, 
suggesting that private benefits increase in the Chairman’s ownership stake.  
 
Table 8. Additional estimation results for key characteristics of CEOs and boards.  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
CEO ownersh -0.1994  -0.2007 -0.2118* -0.2217* -0.2472** -0.2524**
 (0.1217)  (0.1242) (0.1262) (0.1293) (0.1196) (0.1195)
CEO ownersh
2  0.0260* 0.0261* 0.0282** 0.0293** 0.0326**  0.0336**
 (0.0140)  (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0145) (0.0134) (0.0134)
CEO _tenure 0.0459**  0.0459** 0.0484** 0.0484** 0.0511***  0.0500***
 (0.0205)  (0.0206) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0192) (0.0191)
CEO tenure
2  -0.0027* -0.0027* -0.0027* -0.0026* -0.0027* -0.0027*
 (0.0015)  (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
CEO_age -0.1363**  -0.1361** -0.1222** -0.1222** -0.1153** -0.1144**
 (0.0556)  (0.0560) (0.0542) (0.0542) (0.0549) (0.0532)
CEO age
2  0.0013** 0.0013** 0.0012** 0.0012** 0.0011** 0.0011**
 (0.0005)  (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
RD_no_directors -0.3038***  -0.3032*** -0.3050** -0.3002** -0.3071** -0.3015**
 (0.1158)  (0.1163) (0.1196) (0.1183) (0.1216) (0.1193)
RD no directors
2  0.0159*** 0.0158*** 0.0157*** 0.0154*** 0.0157*** 0.0154***
 (0.0057)  (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0058)
BRD_av_ownersh -0.1345 -0.1307 -0.0551 -0.0766 -0.2549 -0.2699
 (0.2702)  (0.2711) (0.2767) (0.2971) (0.2004) (0.2006)
BRD av ownersh
2  0.0148 0.0145 0.0091 0.0113 0.0271 0.0284
 (0.0238)  (0.0238) (0.0243) (0.0261) (0.0179) (0.0179)
BRD_nonex_share  0.1423 0.1393 0.4272 0.3846 0.3863 0.4092
 (0.8372)  (0.8415) (0.8191) (0.8172) (0.8309) (0.8375)
BRD nonex share
2  -0.0172 -0.0148 -0.2584 -0.2326 -0.2288 -0.2506
 (0.6048)  (0.6070) (0.5950) (0.5907) (0.6040) (0.6109)
BRD_male_share  0.0185 -0.2096 -0.2351 -0.2705 -0.0395 0.0231
 (0.3290)  (1.7204) (1.6819) (1.6829) (1.6372) (1.6223)
BRD male share
2   0.1477 0.2238 0.2365 0.1436  0.1040
   (1.1059) (1.0808) (1.0837) (1.0581)  (1.0475)
BRD_av_age   -0.0181** 0.0579 -0.0181**  -0.0183**
   (0.0077) (0.0695) (0.0077)  (0.0078)
BRD av age
2   -0.0009  
   (0.0008)  
CHAIR_gender   -0.1508  -0.1404
   (0.1562)  (0.1582)
CHAIR_ownersh   0.1105***  -0.0303
   (0.0371)  (0.1338)
CHAIR_age   0.0001  0.0016
   (0.0035)  (0.0273)
CHAIR ownersh
2     0.0184
     (0.0154)
CHAIR age
2     -0.0000
     (0.0003)
r2  .39 .39 .39 .39 .39 .39
p  9.28e-43 2.05e-42 4.70e-43 7.59e-43 5.43e-49 4.93e-49
N  950 950 947 947 947 947
Note: The table shows only the key variables of interest. The dependent variable is the voting premium, VP. The 
results are obtained using the fixed-effects estimator. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
  30The coefficients on the other variables of interests do not change much in Table 8 as 
compared with Tables 6 and 7. In particular, we still observe statistically significant 
relationships between the voting premium (our measure of private benefits) on the one hand 
and CEO ownership, tenure, and age as well as board size, on the other hand.  
  We next use the regression in Column 5 of Table 8 (our preferred model) to present 
the estimated non-linear relationships in a graphical form. In particular, for each percentile 
(from the 1
st to 99
th) of the distributions of variables CEO_ownersh, CEO_tenure, CEO_age, 
and BRD_no_directors we calculate the estimated effects and the 10 and 5 percent confidence 
intervals. The results are shown in Charts 1 to 4.   
  Chart 1 suggests a U-shaped relationship between CEO ownership and the voting 
premium. However, the turning point occurs quite far on the right of the distribution of CEO 
ownership (at 3.8 percent, the sample average is way below, 0.4 percent only), and the right 
branch of the parabola is only marginally significant (the 5 percent confidence interval 
contains zero already at the turning point). Overall, our results can be interpreted as 
suggesting that the incentive effect prevailing at low levels of CEO ownership gets 
countervailed by other effects (e.g., entrenchment), but the small number of observations with 
substantial CEO ownership does not allow us to get a more precise picture.   
  Chart 2 depicts the relationship between CEO tenure and the voting premium. This is 
a downward facing parabola, with a very wide confidence interval in the right tail of the 
distribution of CEO tenure. The turning point, which is at 9.5 years, is far above the average 
tenure in the sample, which is 3.6 years only. As there is no theory suggesting why CEOs 
with long tenures may extract less private benefits of control, we interpret this result as 
positive but diminishing relationship between CEO tenure and private benefits.  
  Chart 3 shows the relationship between CEO age and the voting premium. This is a 
well-defined upward facing parabola with the turning point at about 52.4 years of age. This 
number is pretty close to the sample average, which is 51.2. The effect is statistically 
significant on the whole support of CEO age.  
  Finally, Chart 4 shows the relationship between board size and the voting premium. 
This is an upward facing parabola with the turning point at about 9.7 (the sample average is 
8.1). The effect is negative and statistically significant, except for the extreme right of the 
distribution of board size, where the confidence interval contains zero. Overall, the chart 
provides substantial evidence for the optimality of the medium-sized boards.  
  31Chart 1. The estimated relationship between the voting premium and CEO ownership share 
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  338. Results discussion 
How can we interpret the results of our empirical analysis? Are they consistent with the 
existing literature, fully or partly? Below we offer a brief discussion of these issues.  
One of the key findings from our analysis is a non-linear relationship between CEO 
ownership and private benefits of control. We observe a decline in the voting premium when 
CEO ownership increases in the range of zero to four percent. However, further increases in 
CEO ownership are associated with increases in the voting premium. This finding is 
consistent with the incentive alignment argument at low levels of CEO ownership and the 
entrenchment and/or risk aversion effects at higher levels of CEO ownership. It is similar, for 
example, to the findings of the influential study by Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) 
suggesting that the entrenchment effect is dominant between five percent and 25 percent, and 
the alignment effect is dominant in the ranges of zero to five percent and also above 25 
percent managerial ownership. It is also similar to the recent findings by Benson and 
Davidson (2009) who report a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO 
ownership and company value. Note that we cannot prove or dismiss the prevalence of the 
incentive alignment argument at high values of CEO ownership due to the lack of variation in 
our data. The largest ownership stake held by CEOs is below 14 percent in our sample. 
Nevertheless, our analysis provides important additional evidence for non-linearities 
associated with CEO ownership. 
Perhaps, one of the most interesting (and also somewhat puzzling) results is the U-
shaped relationship between CEO age and private benefits of control, with a dip in private 
benefits occurring when CEOs are about 52 years old. The interpretation of the right branch 
of this parabola is rather intuitive, as it is consistent, for example, with the idea that older 
CEOs have shorter decision horizons and are less concerned about their careers, which makes 
the extraction of private benefits of control a more attractive strategy. Indeed, Davidson et al. 
(2007) show that older CEOs are more likely to engage in earnings management. The left 
branch of the parabola (large private benefits for young and very young CEOs) is more 
difficult to justify based on the existing theories, such as those focusing on career concerns or 
life-cycle consumption patterns. The issue apparently deserves a special and detailed 
investigation. 
Our analysis suggests a positive relationship between CEO tenure and the voting 
premium, albeit with some curvature at the top of the distribution of CEO tenure. This 
positive but diminishing relationship is consistent with the hypothesis that CEOs with longer 
tenures have greater influence on the selection of new directors and greater control of the 
board in general. Greater control over the board makes CEOs less constrained in their 
  34decisions, including extraction of private benefits. Overall, this result is in line with the 
findings from several other studies, such as Daily and Dalton (1994) and Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni (1994) who show a central role of CEO power (which accumulates with tenure) in 
corporate governance. 
We find a nonlinear relationship between the voting premium and the size of corporate 
boards. An increase in the board size in the range from 5 to 9 directors reduces the voting 
premium. However, for large boards with 10 to 17 directors, adding an extra director seems to 
increase the voting premium. This result is partially consistent with a number of previous 
studies suggesting that large boards are ineffective in monitoring managers (Eisenberg, 
Sundgren and Wells 1998); it is also consistent with the literature suggesting potential flaws 
of small boards, such as greater involvement of CEOs in selecting directors (e.g., Shivdasani 
and Yermack 1999) or the lack of capacity (Jensen 1993). Overall, the quadratic relationship 
that we report in our study is similar to the findings in some studies, such as Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) for the banking sector. More substantially, our results are in line with the 
notion of the optimal board size, expressed in Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992). 
The fact that we use a proxy of private benefits of control rather than a conventional measure 
of corporate performance reinforces these previous findings in a non-trivial way. Of course, 
there is a caveat that our results are not necessarily interpretable in the causal sense because of 
the lack of exogenous variation in the data. Indeed, the endogeneity of board size has been an 
important issue in the corporate governance literature, although different studies report 
different results (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Beiner et al. 2004; Harris and Raviv 2008). 
Among other characteristics of corporate boards, we find a non-trivial association 
between the average age of directors and private benefits of control. The latter seem to 
decrease with the average age of board members. This result can be related to greater 
experience or higher independence of more senior members of corporate boards. We admit, 
however, that this issue may deserve additional and more detailed analysis.  
The results also show a positive association between the ownership stake of the 
Chairman and the voting premium, which is rather counterintuitive. Indeed, other things being 
equal, larger ownership stakes can be thought to increase the motivation of directors to 
monitor managers and thus should be associated with smaller private benefits (or, at least, one 
can expect no positive effect, similarly to what we observe for the average ownership stake of 
directors). We interpret this result as having to do with a particular feature of corporate 
governance in Russia, namely, that a departing CEO (regardless of whether this is due to age 
or poor performance) is often offered the position of the firm’s Chairman. This was 
particularly common in the 1990s and early 2000s, with the generation of CEOs who acquired 
  35significant ownership stakes in their firms during the process of privatization. Evidence of 
such transitions from the position of CEO to the position of Chairman can be found, for 
example, in Rachinski (2005), who calls them “honor retirements”. 
Finally, our econometric results suggest no gender effects. The reason may be in the 
selection process accompanying women’s promotion to the top of the corporate hierarchy: 
while women are, for example, more risk averse and less overconfident than men in the 
population in general, women in the corporate headquarters are not necessarily so. Indeed, 
several studies, such as Johnson and Powell (1994) and Atkinson, Baird and Frye (2003) 
provide evidence that such gender differences are considerably smaller among managers than 
in the general population.  
 
9. Conclusion 
Starting with Berle and Means (1932), the corporate governance literature has dealt with the 
question of which governance mechanisms and arrangements can best mitigate the corporate 
governance conflict between suppliers and users of capital, a key issue in the functioning of 
the modern corporation (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Recently, there has been growing interest 
in the role of various characteristics of CEOs and corporate boards, including directors’ 
gender, age, tenure, and ownership stakes in the firm. In this paper we study how these 
characteristics are related to private benefits of control, which are a direct indicator of 
corporate governance problems in firms. This is the key strength of our paper relative to the 
existing literature, which typically examines the effect of corporate governance mechanisms 
and arrangements on firm performance. 
  Our analysis suggests that increases in CEO ownership, at least until the threshold of 4 
percent, mitigate corporate governance conflicts between the suppliers and users of capital. 
Further increases in CEO ownership seem to be associated with higher private benefits, due to 
the managers’ entrenchment or risk aversion. We also find that CEO longevity at the top 
position in the firm is associated with larger private benefits. One of the most interesting and 
somewhat puzzling findings, which may require additional research, is the non-linear 
relationship between private benefits and CEO age, with the minimum at 52 years of age. We 
also find evidence suggesting the optimality of medium-sized boards as opposed to very small 
one and very large one. This finding adds to the long-standing debate about the effect of board 
size on corporate performance. Finally, our analysis does not suggest any effect of the gender 
composition of supervisory boards on private benefits of control.  
Our paper is among the first to focus on the link between key characteristics of CEOs 
and boards on the one hand and private benefits of control on the other hand and is therefore 
  36of exploratory nature. As such, it has a number of limitations, which should be addressed in 
further studies. One limitation is that our results do not necessarily imply causal relationships. 
In particular, the results may be influenced by omitted variables and reversed causation. 
Although fixed effects specifications, which our study is based upon, take care of some of 
these issues, they do not solve the problem in its entirety. Identification of causal effects 
would require natural experiments and/or strong and valid instruments for a group of variables 
characterizing CEOs and boards, which are not available to us. Another limitation is related to 
the external validity of our study, stemming from its focus on a single country. Although 
Russia is an important emerging market and has recently been regarded as a promising testing 
ground for economic theories, one cannot automatically generalize from its experiences to 
other economies. Further research focusing on other stock markets is clearly needed.          
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  44Appendix 1. The voting premium approach to measuring private benefits of control. 
The literature knows several theoretical models linking the voting premium to private benefits 
of control, the most influential of which was developed by Zingales (1994, 1995). The model 
assumes that atomistic small investors who hold voting shares may, under certain 
circumstances, become pivotal in a fight for control over the firm and thus can reap a part of 
the private benefits normally available to the party controlling the firm. In contrast to voting 
stocks, non-voting shares are irrelevant in future control fights and their owners, therefore, 
have no access to private benefits. The voting premium thus reflects the price a potential 
bidder would be willing to pay to atomistic holders of voting stock in order to establish 
control over the company and thus may be interpreted as a measure of private benefits of 
control. 
  The model considers the “classical” case of two classes of stocks which are identical 
in all respects, but differ in the voting rights attached to them (one class is voting, and the 
other class is not). Using a number of assumptions, Zingales shows that, in the event of a 
control contest, the voting premium can be represented as the ratio between the value of the 
private benefits of control and the value of cash flow rights (the present value of corporate 
benefits distributed pro rata to shareholders) divided by the fraction of voting shares in the 
company’s equity. In mathematical terms, the following expression for the voting premium 
arises: 
VPCC = (B/y) (1/ π),                            (A1) 
where VPCC denotes the voting premium in the event of a control contest, B measures the  size 
of the private benefits of control, y indicates the value of cash flow rights, and π represents the 
proportion of voting shares outstanding. The intuition behind π is that when the fraction of 
voting shares becomes larger, so does the number of shares among which the benefits of 
control are to be distributed. 
This model applies only in the event of a control contest. Zingales (1995) then argues 
that the voting premium observed in daily trading should reflect the expectation of different 
prices of the two classes of stock in case of such an event. Therefore, it should be equal to the 
voting premium during a control contest times the probability (Φ) that such an event will take 
place: 
VP = Φ VPCC = Φ (B/y) (1/π).                         (A2) 
Thus, according to the model, there are three major determinants of the magnitude of the 
voting premium: the relative size of the private benefits of control (B/y), the probability of a 
control contest, and the fraction of the voting stock in the company’s equity. The probability 
  45Φ of a contested tender offer directly depends on the ownership structure of companies: it is 
essentially zero if a company has a majority shareholder, positive but small if there is one 
large owner and all other shareholders are small, and large when there are multiple large 
shareholders with similar stakes while the remaining shares are distributed among small 
owners. 
  Empirical estimation of model (A2) usually adds a number of control variables. Of 
these, the most important are the variables measuring liquidity of both classes of stock. It is 
also common to include variables measuring differences in some observable rights attached to 
different equity classes (such as different dividends, mandatory bid rule, liquidity 
differentials, etc. (Saito and Silveira 2010). 
 
  46Appendix 2. Some measurement issues. 
In this appendix we briefly discuss important measurement issues related to three variables 
used in our empirical analysis: the voting premium, probability of a control fight, and stock 
liquidity. 
Voting premium. The voting premium is conventionally defined as the difference 
between the price of common shares and the price of preferred shares divided by the price of 
preferred shares. The calculation thus requires the knowledge of stock prices in the relevant 
period. This is a major issue in the Russian context as most stocks are quite illiquid and traded 
only infrequently. As noted by Goriaev and Zabotkin (2006), out of 350 stocks listed in the 
RTS, which is the largest stock exchange of Russia in terms of coverage, only a couple dozen 
were more or less regularly traded in the early 2000s. For many companies, no transactions 
were observed during consecutive days, weeks or even months. This brings major 
methodological challenges to the analysis of stock market prices and returns. The situation is 
even more complicated in our study as calculation of the voting premium requires 
simultaneously observed prices of both common and preferred stocks of the same companies.  
Typical remedies to the problem of thin trading include using averages of transaction 
prices over extended periods and/or imputation of prices based on bid and ask quotations. The 
former approach can be found, for example, in Chung and Wie (2005) and Black et al. (2006), 
who rely on quarterly average share prices in their studies of the contemporary Chinese and 
Russian stock markets. In the case of India’s stock market, Dharmapala and Khanna (2008) 
even employ the 365-day average. Similarly, Hilt (2008) uses quarterly averages in his 
analysis of the 19th century US stock market, which at that time was also characterized by 
infrequent trading and low liquidity. The latter approach is used in Lin and Howe (1990), 
Koutmos and Tucker (1996), and Guillaume et al. (1997), among others. Also, the CRSP data 
files, which are most often used in event studies of the US stock market, report the average of 
the bid and ask prices if a stock does not trade on a given day (Bartholdy, Olson and Peare 
2007). 
Using Russian data, Muravyev (2009b) experiments with various options and finds 
that the results are quite similar regardless of whether one calculates the VP using actual 
prices or imputed prices. Based on this result, in order to calculate the voting premium, we 
use the average of the stock prices imputed from ask and bid quotations over May-August 
each year. Specifically, we first calculate imputed prices of stocks for each trading day and 
then average them over the four-month period.  
Probability of control contests. In the model by Zingales (1994, 1995), the probability 
of a control fight over a firm is among the key factors determining the size of the voting 
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premium of the components unrelated to the private benefits of control. We proxy the 
probability of a control fight by the Shapley value, which is the most popular approach in the 
literature.
21 
There are several approaches for computing the Shapely value (see e.g., Milnor and 
Shapley 1978; Leech 1988; Leech 2003), which often rely on the approximate methods. In 
particular, approximations are needed in the case of large but finite number of players (e.g., 
company shareholders). Approximate solutions are also inevitable because of the reporting 
thresholds, when ownership stakes below a certain threshold are not reported at all (the 
threshold is 5 percent in the Russian case). Clearly, such data provide rather rough 
approximations, but this is the best option available.  
As concerns the exact algorithm used for the computation of the Shapley value, we 
rely on the online software for voting power analysis provided by Dennis Leech and Robert 
Leech from the University of Warwick, http://www.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae, as available in 
February 2010. 
Liquidity variables. Since the studies by Stoll and Whaley (1983) and Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986), the role of liquidity for valuation of securities is widely acknowledged: 
higher liquidity ceteris paribus contributes to higher prices. The logic is simple: the less 
liquid security should have higher trading costs which should be reflected in a lower price of 
that instrument. Moreover, the effect of trading costs is not of second-order and may be 
considerable since these costs have to be incurred every time the asset is traded. 
Measuring liquidity of a stock is somewhat controversial: there is no single measure 
that captures all essential aspects of liquidity (Amihud and Mendelson 1991). It is even more 
complicated to judge relative liquidity of dual class shares. For example, these classes 
typically constitute unequal proportions of company equity and are issued in different 
                                                 
21 Alternative approaches to measuring the probability of a takeover can be found, for example, in Zingales 
(1994) and Smith and Amoako-Adu (1995). Zingales (1994) suggests two proxies: a dummy equal to unity if 
one shareholder owns a majority of stock and zero otherwise and a dummy equal to unity if there are at least two 
large shareholders but neither has a majority of votes. Smith and Amoako-Adu (1995) use a vector of variables 
comprising ownership (the fraction of votes held by insiders), size (measured as the logarithm of the market 
value of equity), and abnormal stock return as a combined proxy for the probability of a takeover. The intuition 
behind the size factor is that larger companies are less likely to be the targets in control contests since cost of 
obtaining control over them is higher. Abnormal stock returns are used in order to measure company 
performance: it is argued that poorly performing companies are more likely to be acquired because takeovers are 
a means of replacing inefficient management. 
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 numbers. Other things being equal, the larger the fraction of a particular class in company 
equity, the higher its liquidity compared to the other class. However, for corporate control 
reasons voting shares may be held more concentrated than non-voting stock. Hence, a large 
share of voting stock may be not traded in the market. As a result, when the fraction of non-
voting stock is relatively small, the number and the volume of transactions may be larger for 
common stock while the ratio of the number of shares traded in the stock exchange to the total 
number of shares may be larger for preferred stock. 
The traditional measure is the ratio of the volume of transactions (in monetary terms) 
to the average absolute percentage change in price. Instead of the volume of trade proxies, 
liquidity may be measured by the number of transactions, the spread between ask and bid 
prices, the number of days between the end of the month and the day of the previous recorded 
stock exchange transaction, etc.  
Our approach to measuring liquidity is based on the ask-bid spread. We believe that 
this approach mitigates the issues related to the unequal number of common and preferred 
stocks issued, as well as to the class differences in the free float in the stock market. The 
liquidity of stocks in our paper is calculated as average_bid/average_ask over May-August for 
each year. The closer this variable to 1, the more liquid the stock is. When it is close to 0, the 
stock is very illiquid. 
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  1  2  3  4  5  6 
CEO_ownersh  0.0103  -0.1170  -0.1886  -0.2143*  -0.2010  -0.2251* 
  (0.0380)  (0.1170)  (0.1253)  (0.1246)  (0.1269)  (0.1263) 
CEO_ownersh
2    0.0174  0.0258*  0.0287**  0.0278*  0.0300** 
    (0.0134)  (0.0145)  (0.0145)  (0.0147)  (0.0146) 
CEO _tenure      0.0179  0.0441**  0.0553***  0.0505** 
      (0.0117)  (0.0209)  (0.0204)  (0.0198) 
CEO _tenure
2        -0.0022  -0.0023*  -0.0027** 
        (0.0013)  (0.0014)  (0.0013) 
CEO _age          -0.0062  -0.1321** 
          (0.0053)  (0.0520) 
CEO _age
2            0.0013** 
            (0.0005) 
SHAPLEY 0.5296  0.5668  0.4823  0.5185  0.5335  0.5833 
 (0.3710)  (0.3754)  (0.3752)  (0.3711)  (0.3761)  (0.3741) 
1/SHARE_VOTING  0.4383 0.2850 0.3524  0.1813 0.1675  0.1697 
 (1.6843)  (1.6902)  (1.7158)  (1.7314)  (1.7108)  (1.6659) 
DIV10 0.3531**  0.3545**  0.3299**  0.3145*  0.3910**  0.3810* 
 (0.1567)  (0.1588)  (0.1612)  (0.1646)  (0.1972)  (0.2059) 
ADR -0.0444  -0.0461  -0.0289  -0.0585  -0.0243  -0.0736 
 (0.1248)  (0.1259)  (0.1308)  (0.1316)  (0.1340)  (0.1312) 
VOTE 0.2261**  0.2187**  0.2231**  0.2211**  0.2213**  0.2062** 
 (0.1044)  (0.1043)  (0.1044)  (0.1035)  (0.1046)  (0.1014) 
VETO 0.0463  0.0358  0.0405  0.0498  0.0516  0.0609 
 (0.1487)  (0.1493)  (0.1478)  (0.1479)  (0.1478)  (0.1465) 
LIQUIDITY_comm 1.3058***  1.3124*** 1.3097***  1.3166*** 1.3217***  1.3480*** 
 (0.2894)  (0.2898)  (0.2879)  (0.2872)  (0.2901)  (0.2870) 
LIQUIDITY_pref -1.3622***  -1.3601***  -1.3534***  -1.3708***  -1.4082***  -1.3914*** 
 (0.2710)  (0.2711)  (0.2704)  (0.2687)  (0.2682)  (0.2638) 
SIZE -0.1292**  -0.1339**  -0.1361**  -0.1291**  -0.1317**  -0.1238** 
 (0.0531)  (0.0537)  (0.0542)  (0.0542)  (0.0541)  (0.0542) 
Industry dummies  Subsumed in firm fixed effects 
            
YEAR_1997 -0.7255***  -0.7223***  -0.7210*** -0.7024*** -0.5867***  -0.6183*** 
 (0.1422)  (0.1408)  (0.1464)  (0.1470)  (0.1432)  (0.1386) 
YEAR_1998 -0.3571***  -0.3528***  -0.3369*** -0.3311*** -0.3235***  -0.3381*** 
 (0.1220)  (0.1212)  (0.1213)  (0.1222)  (0.1224)  (0.1224) 
YEAR_1999 0.2932*  0.2987*  0.2951* 0.2969* 0.2984*  0.2783* 
 (0.1666)  (0.1664)  (0.1656)  (0.1653)  (0.1647)  (0.1648) 
YEAR_2001 -0.1427  -0.1459  -0.1488 -0.1403 -0.1426  -0.1402 
 (0.1051)  (0.1057)  (0.1057)  (0.1068)  (0.1071)  (0.1070) 
YEAR_2002 -0.7527***  -0.7534***  -0.7691*** -0.7655*** -0.7708***  -0.7723*** 
 (0.1544)  (0.1549)  (0.1535)  (0.1543)  (0.1549)  (0.1537) 
YEAR_2003 -0.7882***  -0.7910***  -0.8102*** -0.7971*** -0.8044***  -0.7967*** 
 (0.1567)  (0.1571)  (0.1572)  (0.1583)  (0.1595)  (0.1584) 
YEAR_2004 -0.9876***  -0.9947***  -1.0162*** -1.0008*** -1.0026***  -0.9930*** 
 (0.1563)  (0.1568)  (0.1551)  (0.1569)  (0.1576)  (0.1592) 
YEAR_2005 -0.9024***  -0.9191***  -0.9335*** -0.9127*** -0.9171***  -0.9196*** 
 (0.1928)  (0.1939)  (0.1939)  (0.1961)  (0.1957)  (0.1957) 
YEAR_2006 -1.3705***  -1.3896***  -1.3930*** -1.3621*** -1.3664***  -1.3648*** 
 (0.1549)  (0.1575)  (0.1572)  (0.1613)  (0.1624)  (0.1622) 
YEAR_2007 -1.1421***  -1.1699***  -1.1610*** -1.1290*** -1.1271***  -1.1506*** 
 (0.1847)  (0.1893)  (0.1894)  (0.1931)  (0.1945)  (0.1910) 
YEAR_2008 -0.6462***  -0.6751***  -0.6773*** -0.6530*** -0.6576***  -0.6696*** 
 (0.2239)  (0.2289)  (0.2299)  (0.2321)  (0.2317)  (0.2287) 
YEAR_2009 -0.8296***  -0.8531***  -0.8540*** -0.8309*** -0.8385***  -0.8427*** 
 (0.2131)  (0.2165)  (0.2148)  (0.2174)  (0.2150)  (0.2138) 
INTERCEPT 1.7825  2.0548  1.9609 2.0863 2.3437  5.3567** 
 (2.2298)  (2.2479)  (2.2749)  (2.2868)  (2.2490)  (2.3968) 
R2 .37  .37  .37  .37  .37  .38 
p 2.57e-39  5.54e-40  6.54e-41  1.62e-41 7.64e-40  1.08e-42 
N 1007  1007  1007  1007  1004  1004 
Note: The dependent variable is the voting premium, VP. The results are obtained using the fixed-effects 
estimator. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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            1  2  3  4  5  6 
CEO_ownersh  -0.0224  -0.0456  -0.0633  -0.0698  -0.0720  -0.0731 
  (0.0163)  (0.0415)  (0.0441)  (0.0455)  (0.0462)  (0.0454) 
CEO_ownersh
2    0.0026  0.0039  0.0044  0.0046  0.0052 
    (0.0032)  (0.0034)  (0.0035)  (0.0036)  (0.0036) 
CEO _tenure      0.0125  0.0249  0.0245  0.0242 
      (0.0090)  (0.0163)  (0.0169)  (0.0168) 
CEO _tenure
2        -0.0010  -0.0010  -0.0013 
        (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010) 
CEO _age          0.0009  -0.1155*** 
          (0.0044)  (0.0409) 
CEO _age
2            0.0012*** 
            (0.0004) 
SHAPLEY 0.5563*  0.5610*  0.4911  0.4990  0.4896  0.5042 
 (0.3252)  (0.3248)  (0.3301)  (0.3271)  (0.3266)  (0.3192) 
1/SHARE_VOTING 0.2380  0.2411 0.2623 0.2724  0.2860  0.3260 
 (0.4650)  (0.4652)  (0.4667)  (0.4669)  (0.4656)  (0.4582) 
DIV10  -0.1860*  -0.1851*  -0.1909*  -0.1921* -0.1789 -0.1630 
 (0.1110)  (0.1114)  (0.1106)  (0.1105)  (0.1141)  (0.1103) 
ADR 0.0776  0.0764  0.0737  0.0692  0.0757  0.0536 
 (0.0941)  (0.0945)  (0.0956)  (0.0950)  (0.0944)  (0.0931) 
VOTE 0.1525  0.1517  0.1568  0.1578  0.1566  0.1595* 
 (0.0984)  (0.0984)  (0.0983)  (0.0984)  (0.0981)  (0.0956) 
VETO -0.0435  -0.0466  -0.0396  -0.0372  -0.0366  -0.0173 
 (0.1442)  (0.1444)  (0.1441)  (0.1439)  (0.1449)  (0.1419) 
LIQUIDITY_comm 1.4003***  1.4031*** 1.3978*** 1.4022***  1.4073***  1.4092*** 
 (0.2549)  (0.2556)  (0.2552)  (0.2551)  (0.2558)  (0.2542) 
LIQUIDITY_pref -1.4196***  -1.4208*** -1.4198*** -1.4262***  -1.4389***  -1.4134*** 
 (0.2425)  (0.2432)  (0.2427)  (0.2422)  (0.2428)  (0.2367) 
SIZE -0.0260  -0.0270  -0.0292  -0.0281  -0.0290  -0.0223 
 (0.0397)  (0.0396)  (0.0398)  (0.0398)  (0.0399)  (0.0407) 
POWER       -0.1889  -0.1887  -0.1975  -0.1976  -0.1959  -0.1597 
            (0.1412)  (0.1417)  (0.1422)  (0.1425)  (0.1418)  (0.1398) 
FUELS       -0.1892  -0.1917  -0.1923  -0.1890  -0.1797  -0.1128 
            (0.1520)  (0.1522)  (0.1532)  (0.1532)  (0.1544)  (0.1515) 
CHEMIC      -0.0676  -0.0674  -0.0736  -0.0702  -0.0662  0.0189 
            (0.1674)  (0.1682)  (0.1684)  (0.1697)  (0.1701)  (0.1633) 
MACHIN      0.0257  0.0265  0.0579  0.0595  0.0616  0.0868 
            (0.2513)  (0.2505)  (0.2552)  (0.2551)  (0.2548)  (0.2398) 
TELECM      -0.1926  -0.1847  -0.2020  -0.2007  -0.2068  -0.1502 
            (0.1623)  (0.1642)  (0.1661)  (0.1663)  (0.1657)  (0.1637) 
WSALES      0.2642  0.2629  0.2576  0.2559  0.2578  0.2983 
            (0.2274)  (0.2277)  (0.2278)  (0.2283)  (0.2288)  (0.2374) 
Year dummies  Included, but not shown 
            
Breusch-Pagan test  10.42 10.26 11.11 11.32  11.14  11.50 
 0.0012  0.0014  0.0009  0.0008  0.0008  0.0007 
Hausman test  30.24  30.83 31.69 34.86  44.31  37.74 
 0.1127  0.1271  0.1349  0.0907  0.0140  0.0641 
r2          0.36  0.36  0.36  0.36  0.36  0.36 
p           4.9e-103  1.7e-105 7.7e-105 2.8e-104  2.8e-104  2.3e-110 
N           1007  1007  1007  1007  1004  1004 
Note: The dependent variable is the voting premium, VP. The results are obtained using the random-effects 
estimator. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Two specification tests are reported: the Breusch-
Pagan test for the presence of random effects and the Hausman test for the consistency of the random-effects 
estimator.  
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